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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
however, if the legislatures are unwilling to act, then the retaliation defense
,might be allowed by the courtsa on any number of grounds.0 4 Whether it
be by judicial or legislative action, each state must secure legal protection
for every tenant who exercises his right to secure safe and sanitary living
accommodations.
LARRY SCHAPIRO
SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW-PuRELY ETHICAL OR MORAL BELIEFS
HELD GROUNDS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
On April 24, 1964, petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh, II, applied for a
conscientious objector exemption from military service by filing an applica-
don with his local draft board. Petitioner claimed that the basis for his
conscientious objector beliefs had been formed "by reading in the fields of
history and sociology."1 Upon completion of the application he affixed his
signature to the statement, "I am, by reason of my religious training and
belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," after
he had stricken the words, "religious training and."2 On the same applica-
tion, petitioner denied that he believed in a Supreme Being, but later
amended this, stating that he preferred to leave the issue open. The peti-
63. "[rjhe need for judicial action is strongest in the areas of the law where political
processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legislative power but because the problem
is neglected by politicians." Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAv. L. REv. 91,
122 (1966).
1. 64. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969), raises three theories:
I. the landlord's improper motive deprives the tenant of his first amendment right
to petition the government for a redress of grievances;
2. a citizen's right to inform the government of violations of law is constitutionally
protected;
3. retaliatory evictions are contrary to public policy as enunciated by the legislature.
A fourth theory would allow retaliatory motive to be raised under state statutes which
permit equitable defenses. Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 1110, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281
(Binghamton City Ct. 1968).
A fifth theory could be to argue that the use of the judicial process to order evictions,
where a landlord's principal reason to evict the tenant is for having reported the viola-
tions, constitutes an unconstitutional chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights of the tenants.
Finally, it can be argued: "A normally unrestricted right to sever or refuse to renew
a contractual relationship may be restricted where the reason for such severance or refusal
is contrary to public policy, usually as expressed by some statute. Such cases tend to occur
in labor law .. " Moskovitz, supra note 7, at 6.
1. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. To qualify for conscientious objector exemption, the applicant must file Selective
Service form SSS 150 with his local draft board. This form, which contains the statement
in the text, must be signed by the applicant before he may be considered for conscien-
tious objector exemption.
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tioner was subsequently classified I-A-O. s On November 16, 1965, after con-
sidering petitioner's appeal for I-0 status, the Appeal Board reclassified him
I-A. Based on this reclassification, his local draft board ordered him to re-
port for induction, and, upon his refusal to step forward, he was indicted
and later convicted in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California4 for failure to submit to induction into the Armed
Forces.5 This conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in a divided opinion.6 Certiorari was granted7 and the United States Su-
preme Court, per Mr. Justice Black, reversed, in a five-to-three decision.
Held, if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely
ethical or moral in source and content, but which nevertheless impose upon
him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any
time, such individual is entitled to a conscientious objector exemption.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 833 (1970).
Throughout American history, provisions have existed for exemption
from military service on religious grounds.8 One rationale for this has been
that the "free exercise clause" of the first amendment requires Congress to
provide a method whereby religious conscientious objectors may obtain
exemption from military service. 9 Opponents of religious conscientious ob-
jector exemptions have maintained that they are illegal violations of the
"establishment clause" of the first amendment. 10 In dismissing the existence
of a viable constitutional issue, Congress has chosen to grant exemptions to
religious conscientious objectors, and although the wording of the exemp-
tion provisions has changed over the years, the general intent of Congress
has not. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1917,11 provided exemp-
tion solely for members of certain pacifist religious sects. The scope of
, 3. Under Selective Service classification, a conscientious objector available for non-
combatant duty is classified I-A-0. A conscientious objector who is exempted from all
duty is classified I-O. This is to be contrasted with a classification of I-A which indicates
that the registrant is available for induction at any time.
4. Welsh v. United States, Criminal No. 36138 (C.D. Cal., June 1, 1966).
5. Failure to submit to induction is a federal crime under § 12(a) of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1967).
6. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
7. 396 U.S. 816 (1969).
8. For an early reference to this exemption, see 2 JouRNALS or THE CONMENTAL
CONcGRSS 189 (1905). See also Smith and Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program-A
Search for Sincerity, 19 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 695 (1958).
9. Under the first amendment, Congress is prohibited from requiring anyone to act
contrary to the dictates of his religion. Thus, under the "free exercise clause" theory, if
the doctrine of his religion prohibits his participation in war, he must be provided with
an exemption from compulsory military service.
10. This paradox was stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in his-concurring opinion in
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 247 (1963), where he noted: ".... the
logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses may produce
situations where an injunction against an apparent establishment must be withheld in
order to avoid infringement of rights of free exercise."
11. Military Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, §§ 1, 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78.
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exemption was, expanded by the Act of 194012 which provided that no one
would "be subject to combatant training and service . .. who, by religious
training and belief, was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form."13 This change shifted the emphasis from specific religious sects
to the applicant's beliefs. It was recognized that mere affiliation with a par-
ticular religion did not necessarily indicate a total adherence to that reli-
gion's doctrines. Further, a member of a religion which did not forbid
participation in war could, through personal religious studies, develop deep
convictions against war or other forms of violence. Although this shifted
the focus from the particular religious affiliation to the beliefs of the indi-
yidual, Congressretained the requirement that the beliefs be of a religious
nature.' 4 In recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States6
held that the specific purpose of the phrase "religious training and belief"
was to distinguish "between a conscientious social belief, . . . and one
based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher
nd beyond any worldly one."'16 In contrast, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Kauten,17 had previously construed "religious training and belief"
as being the relationship of man "to his fellow men and to his universe"
through a rule of conscience. 18 However, the courts in both Kauten10 and
Berman2o stated that beliefs based on non-religious philosophical, political,
and social views would not, in themselves, provide a basis for exemption.
The Draft Act of 1948 as amended in 1967,21 provides the present basis for
allowing exemption from military service for conscientious objector be.
liefsY2 Two major considerations are dictated in the application of the
statute to each individual seeking an exemption.23 First, the applicant's be-
liefs must be sincerely held. Second, the applicant's objections to training
and service in the Armed Forces must be based on "religious training and
belief." Sincerity is a subjective concept and the courts have preferred to
12. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
16. Id. at 381.
17. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
18. Id. at 708.
19. Id.
20. 156 F.2d at 380.
21. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1964), amend-
ing 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1948).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 4560). This section reads in part:
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the Armed Forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form. As used in the subsection, the term "religious training and
belief" does -not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.
23. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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yield to the discretion of the local draft boards and appeal boards on this
issue.24 The interpretation of the phrase "religious training and belief,"
however, has been the cause of much controversy.25 Initially, the courts in-
terpreted this phrase to require a belief in a Supreme Being,2 6 but the mod-
ern religious community has caused a broadening of this interpretation.2 7
The definition of "religious training and belief" was the issue before
the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger.2 8 Although Seeger did
not belong to an orthodox religious sect, he claimed that his was a "religious
faith in a purely ethical creed ...without [a] belief in God, except in the
remotest sense."2 0 In consideration of this statement, the Supreme Court
noted the Court of Appeals assertion that it was impermissible to distin-
guish between internally derived and externally compelled religious be-
liefs.30 Although Seeger's conscientious objections resulted from a personally
formulated religious creed, the Court concluded that his views were based
on religious training and belief in the liberal sense, and that he should be
granted a conscientious objector exemption. In Seeger, the Court estab-
lished a test to be applied to the applicant's beliefs when considering his
qualification for exemption. The test is: "whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption." 31 The .Court emphasized, however, that the exemption did
not apply to persons whose opposition to war stemmed from essentially
political, sociological or economic considerations32 nor those who were op-
posed to war on personal moral grounds.38 The Court also noted that Seeger
had not claimed to be an atheist, and that they were not suggesting any
decision concerning litigation involving atheism.3 4
In the instant case the plurality opinion cites Seeger as controlling.85
As has been discussed, the test in determining an applicant's qualification
for conscientious objector exemption under section 6(j) is whether a given
belief that is sincerely held by the registrant is "in his own scheme of things,
24. Id. at 185.
25. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 867 (1968); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
26. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
27. 380 U.S. 163, 179-85 (1965).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 166.
30. Id. at 167.
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id. at 173.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 173-74.
35. Instant case at 335. Mr. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall joined.
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religious."3 6 In applying this test to the instant case, the plurality noted
that although petitioner could not characterize his beliefs as "religious" in
the conventional meaning, he did claim that his beliefs were "certainly
religious in the ethical sense of that word."37 This fact, coupled with the
court of appeals' concession that Welsh's beliefs were held "with the
strength of more traditional religious convictions,"3 8 enabled the plurality
to conclude that petitioner's beliefs brought him within the exemptive scope
of section 6(j). 39
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan agreed that petitioner
should be exempted from induction based on his beliefs. He reached this
conclusion, however, only after consideration of the constitutional issue of
whether granting exemptions only to those whose pacifist views are based on
religious considerations "runs afoul" of the first amendment.40 Justice Har-
lan argues that even a simple reading of section 6(j) indicates a congres-
sional intent to distinguish between religious beliefs and those beliefs which
are "essentially political, sociological or philosophical" or a "personal moral
code." 41 He thus reasons that Congress intended to distinguish between the
concepts of morals and religion and to provide conscientious objector ex-
emptions solely for those whose beliefs were religious in nature.42 Justice
Harlan notes that under the establishment clause of the first amendment,
distinctions may not be made between religious beliefs and secular beliefs
for purposes of exemption. Faced with this constitutional question, the
issue of remedies becomes important. Justice Harlan concedes that constitu-
tional provisions would permit Congress to eliminate all exemptions for
conscientious objectors.43 If exemptions are granted, however, then they must
encompass individuals whose beliefs result from a purely moral source as
well as a religious source. Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the Court is
faced with two alternatives. They must either deny exemption to all by
nullifying section 6(j), or extend the coverage to include those originally
excluded. Noting the statutory severability clause,44 the concurring opinion
reasons that Congress intentionally provided for future alterations if the
court found them necessary. Thus Justice Harlan reasons that to implement
the congressional intent of providing conscientious objector exemptions on
36. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
37. Instant case at 341.
38. Id. at 343.
39. Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. § 456(j).
40. Instant case at 345.
41. Id. at 351.
42. Id. at 354.
43. Id. at 356.
44. Id. at 364. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 75,
.88 § 5, amending 62 Stat. 604 (1948), reads in part:
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances
is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such
provisions to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
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religious grounds, exemption should be extended to those whose conscien-
tious objection is based on sincere moral, ethical, or philosophical beliefs.
Since the pluralities' conscientious objector test satisfies this result, Justice
Harlan concurs in the decision.
In dissent, Mr. Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Mr.
Justice Stewart joined, addressed both the interpretation of section 6(j) and
the constitutional issue discussed by Justice Harlan. Without evaluating the
"Seeger test," the dissent reasons that "construing [section] 6(j) to include
Welsh exempts from the draft a class of persons to whom Congress has
expressly denied an exemption." 45 The dissent concludes that the majority
decision does not accurately reflect the intent of Congress and that Welsb
should be denied an exemption. 40 Turning to the constitutional issue, the
dissent notes that even assuming the existence of a constitutional issue,
Welsh would still be required to submit to induction. The dissent's reason-
ing is, that if section 60) constitutes an establishment of religion in viola-
tion of the first amendment, then this section would have to be declared
void and all exemptions withdrawn 47
The Supreme Court's ruling in Welsh has broadened the scope of sec-
tion 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. In reaching its
conclusion, the plurality primarily relied on the "test" developed in Seeger.
Great emphasis was placed on the similarities between the development of
pacifist views of Welsh and Seeger.48 Based upon these similarities, and the
fact that Seeger had been granted an exemption, the plurality concluded
that Welsh should also be exempted from military service. The fundamental
problem in this approach is that a critical evaluation of the Court's rationale
in Seeger was not made. The Court in the instant case interpreted the hold-
ing of Seeger to mean that any belief which is "sincere and meaningful" and
"which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the
statutory definition."49 As mentioned above, however, the Court in Seeger
specifically noted that it was not dealing with just "any belief" and that
beliefs based on a personal moral code, sociological considerations, or athe-
ism were excluded.50 They continued by considering those beliefs which
were to be included within the scope of exemption. In doing this, they went
to great lengths to develop a liberal interpretation of the concept of "God!"
or "Supreme Being" in accordance with the modern religious community.
Including this interpretation of God in the definition of atheism,5 1 it be-
45. Instant case at 368.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 335-44.
49. Id. at 339.
50. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-74 (1965).
51. VRSTER'S NEW WoRD DICrIONARY oF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 92 (1964).
Atheism is the denial of the existence of a "God" or "Supreme Being."
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comes evident'that the Court in Seeger was not concerned with beliefs which
deny the existence of a "supernatural power." Conversely, they were only
concerned with applicants who believed in some form of "supernatural
power." Thus a prerequisite to the application of the Seeger test is that the
registrant has a belief in a "supernatural power," i.e., he must have a belief
in some form of religion. If taken in context, the Seeger test becomes a test
as to the role that religious belief plays in the applicant's life, not a test as
to the existence of a religious belief. With this interpretation of the Seeger
test, the plurality in the instant case would have found it difficult to estab-
lish a basis on which to hold that Welsh qualifies for conscientious objector
exemption. This appears to lead to the same result reached by the dissent.
Specifically, under the present wording of section 6(), Welsh does not
qualify for conscientious objector exemption. If the plurality had arrived
at this conclusion, they may have considered the constitutional issue raised
in the concurring opinion, and mentioned in the dissent. As previously dis-
tussed, the constitutionality of section 6(j) has been questioned on the
ground that it violates the "establishment clause" of the first amendment.
Justice Harlan argues that to correct this violation, exemptive coverage
should be extended to all conscientious objectors, not limited to religious
conscientious objectors. 52 Although the dissenting opinion did not acknowl-
edge the existence of a constitutional conflict, the issue was discussed in
hypothetical terms, 53 resulting in a conclusion contrary to Justice Harlan's.
The reason for this conflict appears to lie in the interpretation of legislative
intent regarding section 6(j). If the intent of Congress was to prevent Welsh
and others of similar view from obtaining an exemption based upon their
beliefs, as the dissent contended, 54 and the constitutional question is rele-
iant, then the intent of Congress must be honored, and section 6() nulli-
fied. If, however, as according to Justice Harlan, the intent of Congress was
to provide exemptions for religious conscientious objectors, then, in order
to resolve the conflict and still honor congressional intent, section 6(j) would
have to be extended to cover all conscientious objectors. It is conjecture to
attempt to preditt whether the plurality would have, if agreeing to the
presence of a constitutional issue, resolved the issue in agreement with
Justice Harlan, or turned to the rationale of the dissent. Regardless of what
biight have occurred, however, the effect of the holding in the instant case
is to extend the scope of the coverage of section 6(j) to include any appli-
cant who holds beliefs which operate in his life as religious beliefs operate
in the lives of others. The major consideration in future applications for
conscientious objector exemption will not be the source of the beliefs which
dictate pacifistic principles, but rather the strength of those beliefs and the
52. Instant case at 356.
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id.
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sincerity with which the applicant abides by them. Under these criteria, it
is conceivable that an applicant who objects to participation in a particular
war, rather than war in general, would also qualify for exemption. If, for
example, an applicant sincerely believes that the present war in Viet Nam
is immoral based on his personal system of beliefs, and if those beliefs
govern his way of life, he would qualify for exemption. Thus, in addition
to expanding the scope of exemption to include beliefs of other than tradi-
tional religious origin, the instant case may have paved the way for granting
exemptions from individual wars or conflicts.
ROGER G. BuuNGAm
TAXATION-TAx BENEFIT RULE APPLICABLE TO SEcTION 337 LIQUIDA-
TIONS
Taxpayer, Anders, was the sole transferee of the proceeds of the sale
of assets of Service Industrial Cleaners, Inc., and as the sole stockholder of
the corporation, was liable for tax deficiencies assessed against the corpora-
tion. The corporation had distributed the proceeds from the sale of its
assets pursuant to a properly executed section 3371 liquidation plan. The
gain from the sale of the corporation's assets, $446,601, was treated by the
corporation as gain entitled to non-recognition under the provisions of sec-
tion 887. Of the gain, $233,000 was allocable to the sale of certain rental
items, the cost of which had been fully deducted by the corporation in the
year of purchase under section 162 (a) .2 The taxpayer's position was that
the proceeds from the sale of previously expensed rental items was gain en-
titled to non-recognition under section 337. This was contested by the com-
missioner, who contended that the non-recognition provisions of section 837
were subject to the tax benefit principles, 3 and therefore, the gain from the
I. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 337 (a) reads as follows:
§ 337. GAIN OR LOSS ON SALE OR EXCHANGES IN CONNECTION WITH
CERTAIN LIQUIDATIONS.
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954,
and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan,
all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less
assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or ex-
change by it of property within such 12-month period.
2. Id. § 162 (a) reads as follows:
§ 162. TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-There shall be alowed as a deduction all the ordinary mid neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ....
3. The tax benefit rule states that amounts deducted from ordinary income in one
year will be treated as ordinary income in the year of recovery.
